SUMMARY: This paper investigates the relation between the extent of a firm's past and expected future losses or negative cash flows and the ex ante probability that it will manipulate revenues. When a firm has a string of losses or negative cash flows, traditional valuation models do not yield reliable estimates of firm value, and traditional price-earnings ratios are not meaningful. Evidence suggests that market participants tend to value loss firms on the basis of the level and growth in revenues, rather than cash flows and earnings, thereby motivating these firms to overstate revenue. In fact, empirical results indicate that there is a positive relation between the number of years that firms exhibit and/or anticipate losses or negative cash flows and investment in receivables after controlling for credit policy. We further show that the ex ante likelihood that firms manipulate revenue in violation of GAAP is positively associated with the history of past and expected future losses or negative cash flows, as well as with the investment in accounts receivable ͑adjusted for credit policy͒. Our results suggest another indicator of manipulation that may be used by auditors and regulators in identifying firms that are more likely to overstate revenues.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to show that the greater a firm's string of past and expected future losses or past and expected future negative operating cash flows, the more likely it is to violate GAAP by overstating revenues and accounts receivable in order to induce a higher market valu-ation. This in turn suggests a new indicator of manipulation that may be used by auditors and regulators in identifying firms that are more likely to overstate revenues. 1 The linkage between loss firms and revenue manipulation has its logical genesis in the popular press and the accounting literature on Internet firms. Both of these sources maintain that, absent a sufficient time series of positive earnings and cash flows, traditional valuation models such as the discounted cash flow and discounted residual earnings models do not yield reliable estimates of firm value. Given negative earnings or negative cash flows, analysts tend to follow the price-tosales ratio instead ͑e.g., Demers and Lev 2001͒ . In addition, although revenues are not the only source of value-relevant information, a number of academic studies have shown that the market views revenues and revenue growth as highly important in valuing Internet firms ͑Hand 2000; Trueman et al. 2000 Trueman et al. , 2001 Bagnoli et al. 2001; Campbell and Sefcik 2002; Davis 2002; Bowen et al. 2002͒ . This study extends the argument to loss firms in general. If the market substitutes revenues and revenue growth for earnings and earnings growth in valuing Internet firms because losses or negative cash flows do not provide much if any value-relevant information, then the same argument applies almost as forcefully for other firms with strings of past and expected future losses or negative cash flows.
The relative importance of revenues in determining the market capitalization of firms that report a string of losses or negative cash flows ͑henceforth loss firms͒ provides an incentive for these firms to manipulate revenues in order to achieve greater market capitalization.
2 For the same reason, loss firms are less interested in manipulating expenses because earnings are not particularly value relevant. Firms for which earnings are value relevant may also attempt to manipulate revenues but, in contrast to loss firms, are just as likely to manipulate expenses ͑e.g., Enron͒. Therefore, loss firms should yield a less "noisy" sample of revenue manipulators by comparison to other firms.
3
In contrast to most studies in the earnings management literature, we investigate earnings manipulation by loss firms through the prism of revenue restatements. In most studies of earnings management, the researcher uses a proxy for earnings management and, therefore, cannot be certain that earnings have in fact been manipulated ͑for a discussion of this issue see Marquardt and Wiedman 2004͒. Exceptions are precisely those studies that are based on restatement data ͑e.g., Richardson et al. 2003͒ . We use restatement data to infer the ex ante likelihood that a firm will manipulate revenues. Restatements arising out of accounting errors involving revenue overstatements are fairly strong indicators of revenue manipulation, and are not necessarily a result of enforcement actions. 4 In what follows, we first show that revenues are value relevant in explaining the market value of loss firms whereas, in contrast, earnings and operating cash flows are not significantly associ-1 On a more conceptual level, this paper also attempts ͑and is perhaps the first͒ to show that the history of earnings and cash flows matters to restatements by loss firms. See Lev et al. ͑2008͒ on this issue in the context of restatements generally. 2 Obviously, some firms may manipulate revenues in order to avoid losses. To the extent that they succeed in showing profits, they are not part of our sample of loss firms ͑if loss firms are defined based on earnings͒. Nonetheless, these firms may be captured in the sample of loss firms if loss firms are defined on the basis of negative operating cash flows. 3 Arguably, a sample of Internet firms might yield a cleaner sample. However, the universe of Internet firms that restated revenues is too small to yield a meaningful sample. 4 The SEC perceives young growth firms to have a higher likelihood of financial statement fraud and financial distress ͑Feroz et al. 1991; Beneish 1997͒ . If the SEC also targets loss firms for filing review ͑a possibility, although without empirical support͒, we would find a higher proportion of loss firms among restaters and a potential spurious correlation between losses and earnings management as gauged by restatements. Although the SEC was involved in approximately 55 percent of the revenue restatements during the time period covered by this study, only a portion of these were initiated by the SEC. In most restatement cases, the SEC launched an investigation subsequent to a voluntary restatement by the company. The latter finding is also supported by Yohn ͑2002͒ and Palmrose et al. ͑2004͒. ated with the market value of these firms. We then document a positive relation between the number of years that a firm exhibits and/or anticipates losses or negative cash flows and its investment in receivables, after controlling for credit policy. This result is consistent with loss firms being more likely to manipulate revenues than profitable firms and suggests another indicator for auditors to identify firms with potential revenue misstatements. Finally, we provide evidence that there is a positive relation between the ex ante probability of revenue manipulation and the number of years that a firm exhibits and/or anticipates losses or negative cash flows. We find that the relation is far more significant for negative cash flows than for earnings losses, which is to be expected since cash flow-based valuation is far more common than earnings-based valuation, especially for large firms ͑Graham and Harvey 2001͒. It is precisely when cash flow valuation fails that managers have an incentive to manipulate revenues in order to maintain or increase market capitalization. We also show that the ex ante probability of revenue manipulation is positively related to the level of accounts receivable ͑after controlling for the credit policy of the firm͒, leverage, the ratio of inventory to total assets, and the volatility of equity returns. While intuition suggests that small young growth firms are candidates for revenue manipulation, our results indicate that a history of losses or negative cash flows is associated with revenue manipulation even after controlling for firm age, size, and growth. The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. The next section reviews the literature on revenue manipulation and develops the hypotheses. This is followed by a section describing the research design, a section which details the data selection criteria, and a section which presents the results. The final section is devoted to a discussion of the findings and their implications for auditing practice.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Pronouncements by the Securities and Exchange Commission ͑SEC͒ and the Financial Accounting Standards Board ͑FASB͒ indicate substantial concern about the tendency of Internet and technology firms to report misleading levels of revenue ͑see FASB 1999, SAB No. 101, EITF 99-17͒. Furthermore, responding to widespread concerns that investors did not receive reliable financial information in relatively recent periods of frenetic revenue growth, regional offices of the SEC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorney General's office cooperated in a legal crackdown of accounting violations related to revenue recognition ͑see Schoenberger 2001͒. Indeed, the total number of restatements due to revenue-related errors has increased substantially over time. The number of revenue-related restatement cases from 1997 to 1999 is almost twice as many as the number of cases in the period from 1988 to 1996 ͑Callen et al. 2006͒ .
The literature on earnings management through revenue manipulation is fairly recent. Dechow et al. ͑1996͒ show that SEC enforcement actions are likely to involve revenue recognition issues. Nelson et al. ͑2002, 2003͒ provide survey data confirming that income-increasing earnings management involving revenue recognition are common occurrences. Plummer and Mest ͑2001͒ provide empirical evidence concerning the incentives firms have to "meet or beat" analysts' expectations through revenue manipulation, while Bagnoli et al. ͑2001͒ find that capital markets respond to revenue surprises. Although these papers provide evidence of revenue manipulation, they do not analyze the relation between loss firms and revenue manipulation.
A second stream of relevant research concentrates on revenue manipulation by young firms. Rangan ͑1998͒, Teoh et al. ͑1999͒, and Shivakumar ͑2000͒ document that firms manage earnings upwards in periods prior to issuing equity in an attempt to increase share value. Marquardt and Wiedman ͑2004͒ argue that firms issuing equity prefer to manage earnings through a mechanism that suggests to the market that the reported earnings level will persist into the future in order to maximize the proceeds from the share issuance. Consequently, relatively new firms refrain from managing income through nonrecurring items, but instead use their discretion over sales revenue or operating expenses to achieve their earnings objectives. In addition, life cycle theory suggests that a growth-maximization strategy is most cost-beneficial when firms are relatively young.
5
Therefore, signaling growth through aggressive revenue recognition methods may result in a positive stock price reaction. Indeed, Anthony and Ramesh ͑1992͒ show that the stock price response coefficient on unexpected sales growth is significantly larger for young firms.
A third stream of literature investigates the importance of revenues for Internet firms. Since most Internet firms report losses and negative cash flows, traditional valuation models cannot be applied and price-to-earnings ratios cannot be meaningfully calculated and compared. This in turn leads to an increase in the importance of revenues, as Internet firms are likely to be valued based upon their revenues. Indeed, Demers and Lev ͑2001͒ show that analysts follow the price-to-sales ratios of Internet companies. Hand ͑2000͒, Campbell and Sefcik ͑2002͒, Davis ͑2002͒, and Bowen et al. ͑2002͒ provide empirical evidence that the market impounds reported revenues in the stock prices of Internet firms, and Bagnoli et al. ͑2001͒ and Davis ͑2002͒ demonstrate that the market responds to revenue surprises. Furthermore, Bowen et al. ͑2002͒ show that revenue levels are strongly associated with the market's valuation of Internet firms. Taken as a whole, there is convincing evidence that Internet firms have economic incentives to manipulate reported revenues in the presence of multiple years of negative reported cash flows and earnings.
Overall, the literature indicates that young firms with negative earnings have economic incentives to report artificially high levels of revenue. The key reasons for revenue manipulation seem to be to create positive expectations of future growth through sales and the incentive to induce higher market capitalization.
6 This paper provides the actual link between losses, revenue manipulation, and market capitalization. Specifically, we show that revenues are value relevant for loss firms in general regardless of industry classification, and that the probability of revenue manipulation is increasing with the firm's string of negative cash flows and losses. Generally, firms manipulate revenues either through accounts receivable or unearned revenues, depending on the reason for the manipulation and the timing of cash collection. Some firms may manipulate revenues in order to smooth growth, whereas other firms may understate revenues to avoid regulatory sanctions or to minimize taxes ͑see Healy and Wahlen 1999͒. In these latter cases, revenue manipulation may be achieved through manipulation of the "unearned revenue" account. In contrast, manipulation to overstate revenues is usually achieved by recording fraudulent sales and/or by the premature recognition of legitimate sales. These forms of manipulation generally flow through accounts receivable. Given this conjecture, we expect that the investment in accounts receivable by loss firms would be higher than by nonloss firms after controlling for credit policy. 5 See Porter ͑1980͒ for a more complete discussion of life cycle theory. 6 Additional incentives to influence stock prices through revenue manipulation include managerial stock option compensation plans and firm access to equity capital ͑see Bowen et al. 1995͒ . These additional incentives are consistent with the arguments in this paper. 7 Clearly the sample of loss firms includes firms that are headed toward bankruptcy. Although these firms may also have incentives to manipulate revenues, it is reasonable to assume that the incentives for doing so are not related to market capitalization since these firms are likely to be valued at their liquidation value. Hence, the inclusion of financially distressed companies probably biases the analysis against finding evidence that relates revenues to market capitalization. We report the results of the analysis excluding financially distressed companies in the sensitivity analysis section. 8 The assumption that all revenue manipulation cases are accompanied by overstatements of accounts receivable biases the analysis against finding a positive association between revenue manipulation and the level of accounts receivable.
This discussion leads us to the following three hypotheses expressed in the alternative form:
H1: There is a positive relation between the extent of a firm's past and anticipated future losses ͑negative cash flows͒ and its ratio of accounts receivable to sales.
Hypothesis 1 follows from our conjecture that accounts receivable is the primary accounting mechanism by which loss firms manipulate revenues.
H2:
There is a positive relation between the extent of a firm's past and anticipated future losses ͑negative cash flows͒ and the ex ante likelihood of revenue manipulation in contravention of GAAP.
Hypothesis 2 is our primary hypothesis. It follows from the conjectured economic incentives of loss firms to manipulate revenues in order to increase firm value.
H3:
There is a positive relation between the accounts receivable to sales ratio ͑adjusted for credit policy͒ and the ex ante likelihood of revenue manipulation in contravention of GAAP.
Hypothesis 3 follows from H1 and H2. To the extent that accounts receivable is the primary accounting mechanism by which loss firms manipulate revenues, we expect to find a positive relation between the level of receivables and the probability of manipulation.
RESEARCH DESIGN Research Design to Test H1
We conjecture that the decision to manipulate revenues in order to maintain or increase market capitalization depends on the expectation of future losses or negative cash flows. If managers ͑and investors͒ do not anticipate future losses or negative cash flows, then managers will expect investors to value the firm using traditional methods that focus primarily on future earnings and cash flows rather than on sales revenue. If investors value firms using capitalized earnings, then managers may have an incentive to manipulate bottom-line earnings through expense manipulation rather than through the overstatement of revenues. Revenue manipulation is often more costly than expense manipulation since the average decrease in market value once the manipulation is discovered is much higher if the manipulation involves revenues rather than expenses ͑see Anderson and Yohn 2002; Palmrose et al. 2004; Callen et al. 2006͒ . In other words, the incentive to rely solely on revenue manipulation is attenuated once managers expect their firm to become profitable.
We define "loss" firms with respect to a "loss ratio," where the loss ratio for year t is computed as the proportion of years in which the firm reported negative net income ͑operating cash flows͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. For example, if the firm has earnings data for the period 1995-2005, the loss ratio for 2001 is computed as the proportion of loss years in the period 1996 to 2004 inclusive. The implicit assumption here is that managers have perfect foresight regarding the sign of net income in the three-year period following year t.
9 This assumption is not as restrictive as it might appear since we know that analysts, who have less information about the firm than managers, routinely provide estimates of expected income. Although one may argue that 9 In the sensitivity analysis discussed below we relax the assumption of perfect foresight.
analysts' estimates are far from perfect, their errors are mostly related to the level of earnings rather than the sign of the earnings. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that managers on average know roughly if their firm will be profitable or not in the foreseeable future.
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To examine whether loss firms have higher accounts receivable balances than profitable firms, we need to control for the credit policy of the firm, since extending trade credit is one of the tools used to maintain and increase competitiveness and market share. 11 Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒
provide a comprehensive overview ͑and empirical evidence͒ of the current theories of trade credit. Consistent with their analysis of the determinants of accounts receivable, we surmise that a firm's investment in receivables is a function of the financial strength of the firm in general, its operational performance relative to its industry competitors, and its stage in the business cycle. The discussion that follows briefly addresses each of these factors. Financially strong firms are able to extend generous credit terms in order to attract and retain customers, but, because of their wealth, are not constrained to do so. Conversely, financially weak firms may be forced to invest in accounts receivable in order to survive, but simultaneously may be constrained by their need for cash inflow. Following Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒, we assume that large firms tend to be financially strong and proxy financial strength by firm size as measured by the natural log of total assets ͑LSIZE͒.
We proxy for the operational performance of the firm relative to its industry competitors using the four-digit SIC median adjusted growth rate in sales ͑MDGRS_P if positive, MDGRS_N if negative͒, and the four-digit SIC median adjusted gross profit scaled by total sales ͑MDGRM͒. MDGRS_P ͑MDGRS_N͒ is computed as the difference between the firm's growth rate in sales and the median growth rate in the firm's four-digit SIC industry if positive ͑negative͒ and 0 otherwise. MDGRM is computed as the difference between the firm's gross profit margin and the median gross profit margin in the firm's four-digit SIC industry. Following Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒, we also include the square of MDGRM ͑MDGRM_SQ͒ in order to control for the potential nonlinear relation between accounts receivable and the gross margin.
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The firm's stage in the business cycle is also related to its credit policy. Young firms are more likely to extend better credit terms to their customers in order to capture greater market share and to generate superior growth rates in sales. The firm's stage in the business cycle can be proxied by ͑the log of͒ age ͑LAGE͒ and log of total assets ͑LSIZE͒. To be consistent with Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒, we also include the square of age ͑LAGE_SQ͒ in our analysis. Following Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒, we predict that accounts receivable is positively associated with LSIZE, LAGE, MDGRS_P, and MDGRM, and negatively associated with MDGRS_N, LAGE_SQ, and MDGRM_SQ. 13 We test H1 by regressing the firm's industry-adjusted accounts receivable to sales ratio ͑MDARS͒ on its loss ratio and on the proxies for the firm's credit policy discussed above, and determine whether the coefficient of the loss ratio is positive and significant. We use both earnings-based and cash flow-based loss ratios ͑LOSS͒. The earnings-based loss ratio for year t is 10 For many firms in our sample, analysts' forecast data are not available or there are very few analysts that cover the firm.
In addition, I/B/E/S provides only one-year-ahead forecasts for the majority of their sample firms. Finally, I/B/E/S does not provide analysts forecasts of future cash flows for most firms. 11 Nonetheless, credit sales are generally costly for two main reasons: first, there is the risk of noncollection, and second, credit sales typically entail an implicit discount. 12 Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒ estimate the credit policy model with ͑and without͒ age and gross margin squared. The rationale for the inclusion of the squared variables is that credit policy is probably a concave function of age and gross margin, meaning that accounts receivable is positively related to the gross margin, but the slope is decreasing. 13 Because of the detailed nature of their data from the National Survey of Small Business Finances, Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒ are able to include in their analysis two additional variables that potentially affect credit policy; namely, whether the firm operates in an urban or a rural environment and the maximum amount that can be drawn on a line of credit.
computed as the proportion of years in which the firm reported negative net income from year t −5 to year t+3 inclusive. The cash flow-based loss ratio for year t is computed as the proportion of years in which the firm reported negative cash flows from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. We perform separate regressions on the earnings and cash flow loss ratios because of the high correlation ͑0.75͒ between these two variables. Formally, we estimate the following model:
where i denotes the firm and t is a time index. We reject H1 if the estimated coefficient of LOSS ͑␣ 1 ͒ is less than or equal to 0.
Research Design to Test H2 and H3
To determine if loss firms manipulate revenues through the overstatement of accounts receivable, we examine whether the ex ante probability of revenue manipulation is positively associated with the loss ratio and the level of accounts receivable, after controlling for factors that affect the credit policy of the firm. Since the probability of manipulation is unobservable, we utilize error restatement data to estimate the probability of manipulation using the two-stage sequential "partial observability" probit model of Poirier ͑1980͒ and Abowd and Farber ͑1982͒.
14 Krishnan and
Krishnan ͑1996͒ apply this model to the auditor's qualification decision. We use the two-stage probit model ͑as opposed to a standard probit model͒ for two main reasons. First, not every firm that is able to manipulate revenues does so. There is a decision calculus involved. Failure to account for this decision results in a sample selectivity problem and potentially biased coefficients.
15 Second, the manipulation of revenues and the discovery of the manipulation take place at two sequential points in time ͑the manipulation at time t and the discovery of the manipulation and the need to restate at time t+x, x Ͼ 0͒. For example, consider a firm that was discovered in year 2002 to have overstated year 2000 revenues and, as a consequence, the firm is required to restate year 2000 revenues. From the perspective of an external observer, the restatement of year 2000 is a two-stage process. In the first stage, management decides to manipulate revenues in year 2000. In the second stage, the manipulation remains dormant until it is discovered in year 2002. Recognizing that the manipulation of revenues and the discovery of the manipulation take place at two sequential points in time implies that of the total set of variables that explain the probability of restatement, some will be specific to the probability of manipulation, such as LOSS, and other variables will be specific to the probability of not discovering the manipulation when the reports are actually manipulated, such as auditor experience ͑EXP͒. Focusing the analysis on each set of factors separately, one set that determines the probability of manipulation and one set that determines the probability of detecting the manipulation, is more likely to lead to the correct parameter values for each separate probability ͑and hence the product of these probabilities͒ than using all variables together to try to explain the overall product of these probabilities; that is, the overall probability of a restatement. In short, properly recognizing the structure of the restatement process should yield better parameter estimates.
14 Poirier ͑1980͒ first developed the two-stage "partial observability" probit model in a simultaneous events context. Abowd and Farber ͑1982͒ further extended the model to a sequential events context. 15 See the discussion of the "partial observability" model by Maddala ͑1983, 362-364͒. In probabilistic terms, the probability of a restatement can be expressed as the joint probability of these two stages. Let P͑.͒ denote the probability of an event and let P͑./.͒ denote the conditional probability. Furthermore, let:
REV_RES it ϭ the event of a restatement of year t financial statements by firm i ͑in year t+x, x Ͼ 0͒; M it ϭ the event of revenue manipulation in year t by firm i; and UM i,t+x ϭ the event that revenue manipulation by firm i remains undiscovered until year t+x, x Ͼ 0.
Using basic probability theory, we can write the probability of a restatement of year t financial statements due to revenue manipulation as the product of the probability that the firm manipulates revenues in year t and the probability that the manipulation remains undiscovered until year t+x, x Ͼ 0, conditional on revenue manipulation in year t:
Assuming that the probability that the firm manipulates its revenues in year t is a positive linear function of a vector of the firm's observed characteristics X i and a white noise innovation term i , allows us to express P͑M it ͒ as:
where ␤ is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Similarly, assume that the probability that the revenue manipulation remains undiscovered until year t+x given that the firm manipulated revenues in year t is a positive linear function of a vector of the firm's observed characteristics Z it and a white noise innovation term it . Then, we can express P͑UM i,t+x / M it ͒ as:
where ␦ is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Substituting Equations ͑3͒ and ͑4͒ into Equation ͑2͒ yields the unconditional probability of a restatement expressed as the product:
͑5͒
Estimating Equation ͑5͒ by maximum likelihood yields consistent estimates of the parameter vectors ␤ and ␦. We conjecture that the ex ante probability of revenue manipulation ͓P͑M it ͒ = P͑X it ␤ + i Ͼ 0͔͒ is a function of the LOSS ratio and other benefits and costs of manipulation. Lacking direct measures of the benefits of manipulation, we proxy for these benefits by firm characteristics that are shown in the literature to be related to ͑the benefits of͒ manipulation. Specifically, we measure the benefits of revenue manipulation by ͑the log of͒ firm age ͑LAGE͒, growth in sales ͑GRS͒, leverage ͑LEV͒, financial distress as measured by Altman's Z-score ͑ALT_Z͒, business risk as measured by the volatility of the firm's equity returns ͑SDR, computed as the standard deviation of the residuals of the regression of daily stock returns on the value weighted market return in the fiscal year͒, and the level of inventories as measured by inventory to total assets ͑INV͒.
Excess sales growth has been shown to be associated with fraud ͑Beasley 1996; Bell and Tabor 1991; Loebbecke et al. 1989͒ . Firms with greater leverage are more likely to violate their debt covenants, providing an incentive to manipulate. Firms in financial distress and firms with high business risk are likely to manipulate revenues to avoid bankruptcy, while the likelihood of fraud is positively associated with financial distress and the risk of bankruptcy ͑Bell and Tabor 1991; Loebbecke et al. 1989͒ . The age of the firm, volatility of stock returns, and the ratio of inventory to total assets are also associated with the likelihood of fraud ͑Stice 1991; Pratt and Stice 1994͒. We also control for the impact of the credit policy of the firm on accounts receivable by using the residual ͑MDARS_RES͒ from the credit policy model of Equation ͑1͒ as a regressor instead of the raw accounts receivable to sales ratio. The residual reflects the excess accounts receivable to sales ratio after controlling for growth in sales, size, age, and profitability. 16, 17 We measure the cost of manipulation by a proxy for managerial turnover that is a consequence of manipulation being discovered ͑TURNOVER͒. Hennes et al. ͑2007͒ show that managerial turnover is highly positively correlated with the size of the Cumulative Abnormal Return ͑CAR͒ around the restatement announcement; the more negative the CAR the greater the likelihood of managerial turnover. To obtain an ex ante measure of turnover, we rank all restating firms by size deciles and compute the average CAR around the restatement for each size decile. Expected managerial turnover is then measured for each firm ͑whether it had to restate or not͒ by the absolute value of the average CAR in the three days around the restatement announcement in the size decile to which the firm belongs. Finally, we also control for firm size ͑SIZE͒ measured by the log of market value of equity. Formally, we assume that
We predict that the coefficients of LOSS, MDARS_RES, LEV, GRS, ALT_Z, SDR, and INV are positively related to the probability of revenue manipulation while the coefficients of TURNOVER, LAGE, and SIZE are negatively related. The probability that revenue manipulation remains undiscovered until year t+x, given revenue manipulation in year t, is assumed to be a function of whether the auditor is one of the Big 8 ͑AUD͒, the auditor's expertise in the industry ͑EXP͒ measured as the log of the number of contemporaneous audit clients in the same four-digit SIC code that employ the same auditor, and firm size ͑SIZE͒. This probability is hypothesized to be negatively related to AUD and EXP since Big 8 auditors and auditors with more industry experience are more likely to discover the manipulation, and so it is less likely to remain undiscovered. 18 We make no prediction about SIZE. Although large firms are scrutinized more closely by auditors, the ability to hide fraud is likely easier in large firms. More formally, we assume that:
͑7͒ DATA Financial statement and price data are collected from the annual Compustat and the monthly CRSP databases, respectively. We begin by identifying all firms included in Compustat from 1992-2005 with nonmissing net income before extraordinary items ͑DATA18͒ and cash flow from operations ͑DATA308͒. Using this sample, we compute the loss ratio. We then eliminate observations with missing values of sales ͑DATA12͒, growth in sales, accounts receivable ͑DATA2͒, inventory ͑DATA3͒, or Altman's Z-score. In addition, we eliminate industries which have no revenue-related restatement cases. 16 Note that the credit policy model was estimated without including the loss ratio among the independent variables. 17 In a sensitivity analysis we estimate the model by including all the variables of the credit policy model along with the ratio of accounts receivable to sales among the independent variables. In a separate analysis, we also estimate the model replacing MDARS_RES with the actual accounts receivable to sales ratio. The results obtained for both analyses are similar to those reported. 18 The negative relation between EXP (AUD) and the second-stage probability can be demonstrated analytically.
We also impose restrictions related to stock returns and market values. We compute annual stock returns from monthly CRSP data returns including dividends. Returns are computed over a period starting nine months before and ending three months after the fiscal year-end. If the firm was de-listed we include the de-listed return. We also require valid market values of equity three months after the fiscal year end. Finally, we remove four-digit SIC codes with fewer than four firms and throughout the analyses we further eliminate the top and bottom 1 percent of each of the variables in the different regressions. The final sample consists of 22,821 ͑3,997͒ firm-years ͑firms͒. Visual inspection of our sample firms shows them to be distributed widely across fourdigit SIC groups with no unusually large concentrations in any specific industry sector.
We collect financial statement restatement data from the General Accounting Office's ͑GAO͒ website and by searching Lexis for restated financial statements for the years starting in 1993 and ending in 2002. On January 17, 2003, the GAO issued a revised restatement report ͑GAO 2003, GAO-03-395R͒ that identified 919 corporate financial restatements due to accounting irregularities between January 1, 1997, and June 30, 2002. Since the GAO database only contains the date when restatements are announced, we hand-collect data for the actual year of restatement͑s͒. Eliminating restatements due to in-process R&D and mergers and acquisitions reduces the GAO sample to 705 corporate financial restatements representing 1,057 restated fiscal years. Searching Lexis we identify an additional 275 corporate financial restatements ͑representing 470 fiscal years͒. Together, the combined restatement sample consists of 980 unique restatements representing 1,527 fiscal years. Merging this total restatement sample with the financial data reduces the number of restated fiscal years to 521, of which 262 years involve restatements of revenues. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the sample firms are generally of medium size; the mean ͑median͒ market value of equity is about $1,717 ͑$110͒ million; the mean ͑median͒ total assets is $1,704 ͑$117͒ million. The mean loss ratio computed based on net income is 0.34, whereas the mean loss ratio computed based on cash flows from operations is 0.29. These loss ratios indicate that the average firm in the sample reports losses or negative cash flows from operations in about one third of the years during the sample period. The sample firms are also relatively young ͑median age is 9͒ and grow faster than their peers ͑the mean industry adjusted growth rate is 12 percent͒.
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for quintiles formed by the loss ratio. We divide the sample firms into quintiles based on the magnitude of the loss ratio-firms with a loss ratio less than 20 percent, firms with a loss ratio between 20 percent and 40 percent, and so on. Of the total number of observations, 14,691 ͑65 percent͒ had a loss ratio less than 40 percent while 2869 ͑13 percent͒ have a loss ratio greater than 80 percent. The table indicates that the median market value of equity and the median total assets decrease with the loss ratio; the median market value ͑total assets͒ with a loss ratio less than 20 percent is $295 ͑$309͒ million, whereas the median market value ͑total assets͒ with a loss ratio greater than 80 percent is $45 ͑$27͒ million. Although there is no discernable pattern in the book-to-market ͑BM͒ and price-to-sales ͑PS͒ ratios, the median BM is the lowest and the median PS is the highest for firms with the highest loss ratios. In addition, median age is consistently decreasing with the loss ratio. The median age for the lowest ͑highest͒ loss ratio quintile is 11 ͑6͒, indicating that young firms are more likely to report losses, consistent with the business cycle theory of Porter ͑1980͒. Finally, the table also shows that firms in the lowest ͑highest͒ quintile have the lowest ͑highest͒ ratio of accounts receivable to sales, 0.158 and 0.184, respectively. This finding is in line with our conjecture that loss firms are more likely to manipulate revenues and that the manipulation flows through receivables.
Panel C shows the Spearman and Pearson correlations among key variables. Consistent with our predictions, the correlation between the loss ratios is positively associated with the ratio of accounts receivable to sales, indicating that firms with higher loss ratios have relatively higher receivables. In addition, the table shows that the Pearson correlations among the loss ratios and median adjusted growth rate in sales are positive and significant, yet the Spearman correlation is negative and significant. Finally, the correlation between the loss ratios is greater than 0.75, suggesting that firms that report long strings of losses also report long strings of negative cash flows and vice versa.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS The Value Relevance of Revenues
Bowen et al. ͑2002͒ investigate whether revenues are value relevant for Internet firms by regressing the market value of equity on earnings and revenues. They report that the coefficient on revenue for loss firm quarters is positive and significant, indicating that revenues are still value relevant after controlling for earnings in explaining market values. To examine whether market value of equity is related to revenues after controlling for earnings, we follow Bowen et al. ͑2002͒ and regress the market value of equity on earnings, revenues, and book value of equity ͑total assets are included in the regression to control for size͒:
where i denotes the firm, t is a time index and the s are parameters to be estimated. The variables 19 Note that our hypothesis is that loss firms manipulate revenues in order to enhance market capitalization. Hence the value relevance of revenues is examined in levels space rather than return space.
the firm reports negative net income before extraordinary items ͑operating cash flows͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. b Panel B shows median statistics by loss ratios quintiles. The top number in each cell shows the median statistic for the loss ratio computation based upon income before extraordinary items. For example, the top number in the top MVE cell indicates that the median MVE of companies with an earnings-based loss ratio between 0 percent and 20 percent is 295. The number in parentheses corresponds to the median statistic for the loss ratio computation based upon operating cash flows. Thus, the number in parentheses in the top MVE cell indicates that the median MVE of companies with an operating cash flow-based loss ratio between 0 percent and 20 percent is 291. The loss ratio based on income ͑cash flow͒ in year t is computed as the proportion of years in which the firm reports negative net income before extraordinary items ͑negative operating cash flows͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. MVE is the market value of equity ͑$millions͒, and n is the number of firm-year observations in each loss ratio quintile. c Panel C shows Pearson ͑Spearman͒ correlations below ͑above͒ the diagonal among key variables. All the correlations are significant at less than 1 percent except for the correlation between MDGRS and LOSS_CF. LOSS_NI ͑LOSS_CF͒ in year t is the proportion of years in which the firm reports negative net income before extraordinary items ͑negative operating cash flows͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. Variable Definitions: AGE ϭ firm's age in years; ARS ϭ ratio of accounts receivable to sales; ASSETS ϭ total assets ͑$millions͒;
BM ϭ book-to-market ratio, computed as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year-end; EXP ϭ number of firms that are in the same four-digit SIC and that employ the same auditor as the firm observation; INV ϭ ratio of inventory-to-total assets; MDARS ϭ four-digit SIC median-adjusted ratio of accounts receivable to sales; MDGRM ϭ four-digit SIC median-adjusted gross profit scaled by total sales, computed as the difference between the firm's gross profit margin and the median gross profit margin in the industry; MDGRS ϭ four-digit SIC median-adjusted growth in sales, computed as the difference between the firm's growth rate in sales ͑total sales in year t divided by total sales in year t−1͒ and the median growth rate in the industry; PS ϭ price-to-sales ratio, computed as the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year-end divided by total sales; and SDR ϭ variance of abnormal returns.
in Equation ͑8͒ are defined as follows:
MVE it ϭ market value of equity measured three months after the fiscal year-end; Assets it ϭ total assets ͑Compustat item DATA6͒; P_BVE it ϭ book value of equity ͑Compustat item DATA60͒ if net income before extraordinary items is positive and 0 otherwise; L_BVE it ϭ book value of equity ͑Compustat item DATA60͒ if net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise; P_Earnings it ϭ net income before extraordinary items ͑Compustat item DATA18͒ if net income before extraordinary items is positive and 0 otherwise; L_Earnings it ϭ net income before extraordinary items ͑Compustat item DATA18͒ if net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise; P_Revenue it ϭ total revenue ͑Compustat item DATA12͒ if net income before extraordinary items is positive and 0 otherwise; L_Revenue it ϭ total revenue ͑Compustat item DATA12͒ if net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise; year dummies ϭ a dummy variable indicating the year of the data observation; and it ϭ white noise innovation term.
The Earnings column in Table 2 shows the OLS estimation results. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. Consistent with Bowen et al. ͑2002͒ and Collins et al. ͑1999͒, the coefficient on book value of equity is positive and significant ͑p-value Ͻ10 percent͒. For profitable firms, the coefficients on both earnings ͑ P_Earnings it ͒ and revenues ͑ P_Revenue it ͒ are positive and highly significant ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒. For loss firms we find that the coefficient on earnings ͑L_Earnings it ͒ is not significantly different from 0. This observation is also consistent with Collins et al. ͑1999͒, who show that the coefficient on earnings for loss firms is not significantly different from 0 for most of their sample years. 20 The coefficient on loss firms' revenues ͑L_Revenue it ͒, however, is positive and significantly different from 0 ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒, indicating that revenues, and not earnings, are the main driver of market value of equity for firms that report losses. Taken as a whole, our results indicate that revenues are value relevant over and above earnings for all firms. However, while earnings are value relevant for profitable firms, they are not value relevant for loss firms. These results demonstrate the singular importance of revenues for loss firms.
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The Cash Flow column shows the results of the regression where the conditioning is based on the sign of operating cash flows. Specifically, P_BVE it and P_Revenue it are the book values of equity and revenues, respectively, if operating cash flows are positive and 0 otherwise. Similarly, L_BVE it and L_Revenue it are the book value of equity and revenues, respectively, if operating cash flows are negative and 0 otherwise. In addition, we replace the earnings variables ͑P_Earnings it and L_Earnings it ͒ with P_CFO it and L_CFO it , respectively. P_CFO it represents operating cash flows if cash flows from operations ͑DATA308͒ are positive and 0 otherwise. Similarly, L_CFO it represents cash flows from operations if negative and 0 otherwise. The results are similar to those reported in the Earnings column. The coefficient on revenues for firms that report negative cash flows is positive and significant indicating that revenues are value relevant for 20 Although the mean coefficient of earnings for loss firms is marginally significant overall, in 12 out of 18 years considered ͑1975-1992͒ the coefficient of earnings is not significantly different from 0. 21 To ensure that our results are not affected by size, we repeat the analysis after scaling all variables by book value of equity and total assets, respectively. In both cases the coefficients are qualitatively similar in sign and significance to those reported. ***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The table shows the estimation results of the regression of market value of equity ͑MVE͒ on earnings, revenues, book value of equity and total assets, conditional on the sign of earnings before extraordinary items ͑Earnings column͒ and the regression of market value of equity on cash flows, revenues, book value of equity, and total assets, conditional on the sign of operating cash flows ͑Cash Flow column͒. MVE is the market value of equity measured three months after the fiscal year end. Assets represent total assets ͑DATA 6͒. n is the number of observations. In the Earnings column, P_BVE is book value of equity ͑DATA 60͒ if net income before extraordinary items is positive, and 0 otherwise. L_BVE is book value of equity ͑DATA 60͒ if net income before extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise. P_Earnings ͑L_Earnings͒ is net income before extraordinary items ͑DATA18͒ if net income before extraordinary items is positive ͑negative͒, and 0 otherwise. P_Revenue ͑L_Revenue͒ is total revenue ͑DATA 12͒ if net income before extraordinary items is positive ͑negative͒, and 0 otherwise. In the Cash Flow column, P_BVE ͑L_BVE͒ is book value of equity if operating cash flows is positive ͑negative͒, and 0 otherwise. P_Revenue ͑L_Revenue͒ is total revenue if operating cash flows is positive ͑negative͒, and 0 otherwise. P_CFO ͑L_CFO͒ is cash flows from operations if operating cash flows ͑DATA 308͒ is positive ͑negative͒, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. To reduce the effect of outliers, we remove the top and bottom percentile of all variables.
firms that report negative cash flows. In contrast, the coefficient on negative cash flows ͑L_CFO͒ is not significantly different from 0.
Credit Policy and the Loss Ratio
Panel A of Table 3 presents the regression results from the OLS estimation of Equation ͑1͒. We use two proxies for the loss ratio, one based on net income and the other based on cash flows from operations. The signs of the coefficients on the control variables are mostly consistent with Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒. Specifically, in the regression where the loss ratio is computed based on earnings ͑Earnings column͒, the level of accounts receivable is positively associated with firm size ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒, which proxies for the firm's financial strength and its ability to extend credit. The level of accounts receivable is also positively related to growth in sales. The coefficient on MDGRS_P ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒ indicates that firms with industry adjusted positive growth in sales tend to extend more generous credit terms to their customers. The coefficient on the negative industry adjusted growth rate ͑MDGRS_N͒ is negative but not significant. The coefficient on current period profitability, which is proxied by the gross margin ratio ͑MDGRM͒, is positive and significant ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒, indicating that profitable firms extend more generous credit terms to their customers. The coefficient on the square of the gross margin ͑MDGRM_SQ͒ is also positive and significant ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒, indicating that the level of accounts receivable is a convex function of the current period gross margin. The coefficient on age ͑LAGE͒ is positive ͑contrary to our expectations͒ but not significant. Most importantly, consistent with H1, the coefficient on the loss ratio ͑LOSS͒ is positive and significant ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒, indicating that firms that experience a sequence of negative earnings report relatively higher ratios of accounts receivable to sales than more profitable firms. The results of the regression where we compute the loss ratio based on cash flows from operations are very similar, and the coefficients on the control variables are almost identical to those reported in the Earnings column. Most importantly, the coefficient on the loss ratio ͑LOSS͒ is also positive and significant ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent͒, again indicating that firms that experience a sequence of negative operating cash flows report relatively higher ratios of accounts receivable to sales.
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Panel B of Table 3 replicates Panel A of Table 3 for loss ratio benchmarks of 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. The loss ratio ͑LOSS_D͒ variable in Panel B is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm's loss ratio is greater than the specified benchmark and 0 otherwise. We estimate the regressions for both the earnings-based loss ratio and the cash flow-based loss ratio. For example, the third ͑sixth͒ column from the left shows the estimation results of the model where LOSS_D takes on the value 1 if the earnings ͑cash flows͒ based loss ratio is greater than 0.5.
In order to conduct the median adjusted analysis, we eliminate four-digit SIC codes containing fewer than three firms with loss ratios less than the benchmark ratio. Panel B of Table 3 shows that the estimated coefficients on the loss ratio dummies ͑LOSS_D͒ are positive and statistically significant across all loss ratio benchmarks, again indicating a positive association between the ratio of accounts receivable to sales and the incidence of losses. The coefficients on the control variables are consistent with those reported in Panel A: the coefficients on size, positive growth 22 In order to check the robustness of our results to different specifications, we conducted the following sensitivity analyses: ͑1͒ we estimated the regressions omitting the square variables, ͑2͒ we included Altman's Z in order to control for the risk of bankruptcy, ͑3͒ we replaced the net income margin with the ratio of cash flows from operations to total sales, ͑4͒ we eliminated firm-years with an Altman's Z ratio less than 1.8, ͑5͒ given the potential correlation between the loss ratio and the gross income margin ratio, we omitted the gross income margin ratio and the square of the gross income margin ratio from the independent variables, and ͑6͒ we estimated the model using raw variables instead of industry median adjusted variables. The results across all specifications are qualitatively similar to those presented in the tables. To reduce the effect of outliers, we remove the top and bottom percentile of growth in sales and gross profit scaled by sales. n is the number of observations. i ͑t͒ is the firm ͑time͒ index.
Variable
(continued on next page)
TABLE 3 (continued)
a Panel A shows the estimation results of the accounts receivable model. LOSS in the Earnings ͑Cash Flows͒ column is the proportion of years in which the firm reports negative net income before extraordinary items ͑negative cash flows from operations͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. The standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. b Panel B shows the estimation results of the accounts receivable model where the loss variable is defined as a dummy ͑labeled LOSS_D͒ equal to 1 if the loss ratio exceeds the benchmark, and 0 otherwise. The benchmarks are provided at the top of the columns. For example, the third column from the left shows the estimation results of the model where LOSS_D takes the value of 1 if the earnings based loss ratio is greater than 0.5. The standard errors are adjusted for White's ͑1980͒ heteroscedasticity correction. Variable Definitions:
MDARS ϭ four-digit SIC median-adjusted ratio of accounts receivable to sales; LSIZE ϭ natural log of total assets; LAGE ϭ natural log of the firm's age; LAGE_SQ ϭ square of LAGE; MDGRS_P ϭ four-digit SIC median-adjusted growth in sales, computed as the difference between the firm's growth rate in sales and the median growth rate in the industry if positive, and 0 otherwise; MDGRS_N ϭ four-digit SIC median-adjusted growth in sales, computed as the difference between the firm's growth rate in sales and the median growth rate in the industry if negative, and 0 otherwise; MDGRM ϭ four-digit SIC median-adjusted gross profit scaled by total sales, computed as the difference between the firm's gross profit margin and the median gross profit margin in the industry; and MDGRM_SQ ϭ square of MDGRM. rate in sales, gross margin, and the square of gross margin are positive and significant, whereas the coefficient on negative growth rate in sales is negative and significant.
Overall, the findings in Table 3 indicate that the ͑industry-adjusted͒ ratio of accounts receivable to sales increases with the loss ratio after controlling for size, age, growth, and current period profitability. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that loss firms overstate revenues in order to inflate their market values. Table 4 , Panel A, shows statistics on the sample of restatements by year. 24 The panel shows that the overall number of restatements consistently increases over time from five in 1993 to 324 in 2000 before beginning to decline in 2001. There were 596 restatements that involve revenues and 931 restatement cases that do not involve revenues. The RES_RATIO column shows the ratio of restatement cases to the total number of firms in Compustat. The data suggest that the relative proportion of restated years has increased from 0.06 percent in 1993 to 3.7 percent in 2000. Untabulated results show that revenue manipulators are scattered around 54 industries ͑based on four-digit SIC codes͒, indicating that revenue manipulation is not an industry-specific phenomenon. Table 4 , Panel B, compares key variables between companies that restated their financial statements due to revenue manipulation and companies that did not restate their financial statements. This panel indicates that companies that restated their revenues have significantly higher market value of equity, a higher loss ratio, and a higher industry-adjusted ratio of accounts receivable to sales. The panel also shows that there is no significant difference in firm age and variability of returns. Finally the difference in the median Altman's Z ratio is marginally significant ͑p-value = 0.097͒. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses that revenue manipulation flows through accounts receivable and that there is a positive link between revenue manipulation and the loss ratio.
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Restatements and Comparing Revenue-Restaters with Nonrestaters
Overall, Table 4 indicates that the incidence of revenue restatements increased during the 1990s, and that companies that restate revenues have higher loss ratios and accounts receivable to sales ratios than do companies that do not restate their financial statements. Below, we examine whether the ex ante probability of revenue manipulation increases with the loss ratio and the accounts receivable to sales ratio ͑after controlling for the credit policy of the firm͒. Table 5 shows the results of the "partial observability" two-stage probit model. The Earnings column shows the estimation results where the loss ratio is computed based on net income, and the Cash Flows column shows the estimation results where the loss ratio is computed based on cash flow from operations. The first two columns of results measure the loss ratio as the proportion of years in which the company reported negative net income before extraordinary items ͑cash flows from operations͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. We also re-estimate the model with an "historical" loss ratio ͑LOSS_HIST͒ measured from year t−5 to year t in the last two columns of Table 5 .
The Probability of Revenue Manipulation and the Loss Ratio
All regressions are significant at less than the 1 percent level based on the Wald and Lagrange 23 Loss firms are likely prone to selling or securitizing their receivables because of their financing needs. If anything, the sale of receivables biases against our finding that loss firms over-invest in receivables. Compustat does not provide data on the sale of receivables or securitizations and therefore we are unable to account for them in our analysis. 24 Note that the sample of restatements consists of all restated years. The number of restated years used in subsequent analyses is smaller due to the lack of Compustat or CRSP data for many of the companies in the restatement sample. Multiplier ͑LM͒ statistics, both of which are distributed Chi-squared. The parameters in the Stage 1 probability model, namely, the probability of revenue manipulation, are broadly consistent with our predictions, especially when LOSS and LOSS_HIST are measured in terms of cash flows. Specifically, when computing the loss ratio based on income before extraordinary items we find that the coefficient on the loss ratio is positive and significant ͑p-value Ͻ10 percent, two-tailed͒, indicating a positive association between the probability of revenue manipulation and the extent of past and expected future losses, consistent with H2. The coefficient on MDARS_RES, the residual from the estimation of the credit policy model, is also positive and significant ͑p-value Ͻ10 percent, two-tailed͒. This indicates that the probability of revenue manipulation is also increasing with the ratio of accounts receivable to sales after controlling for the credit policy of the firm, consistent with H3. In addition, the coefficients on LEV, SDR, and INV are positive and highly significant ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent, two-tailed͒, suggesting that the probability of revenue manipulation increases with ͑1͒ the closeness of the firm's debt to its covenant limits, ͑2͒ the firm's business risk as measured by the volatility of its equity returns, and ͑3͒ its excess inventories. All other coefficients are insignificant. The conditional probability of the manipulation not being discovered given that revenues are manipulated is negatively and significantly related to the auditor's experience in the industry ͑EXP͒ ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent, two-tailed͒, consistent with expectations. This conditional probability is positively and significantly related to firm SIZE ͑p-value Ͻ1 percent, two-tailed͒, consistent with revenue manipulation being harder to discover in larger firms despite the additional monitoring. The dummy variable for auditor from the Big 8, AUD, is not significant.
The results of the cash flow model are generally similar but with three major differences. First, the LOSS ratio is now significant at less than the 1 percent level, two-tailed. Second, the MDARS_RES coefficient is no longer significant at conventional levels. Third, the TURNOVER coefficient is now negative and significant ͑p-value Ͻ5 percent, two-tailed͒ implying that the probability of revenue manipulation decreases with the cost of manipulation as measured by expected management turnover ͑as a consequence of the restatement͒. The overall stronger results for the cash flow measure of LOSS relative to the earnings measure suggests that the equity market tends to value firms based on cash flows rather than earnings. When past and projected cash flows are negative, markets no longer value firms by their cash flows but by their revenues and revenue growth, giving management the incentive to manipulate revenues in order to increase firm value.
The results for LOSS_HIST are essentially identical to the results for LOSS when cash flows are the benchmark, again suggesting that negative cash flows are a better benchmark than earnings losses when trying to evaluate firm revenue manipulation. When LOSS_HIST is measured by TABLE 4 (continued) ***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. a Panel A shows the number of restatement cases by category and as a proportion of the total number of firms. REV_RES refers to restatement cases involving revenues. EXP_RES refers to restatement cases not involving revenues. ALL_RES is the total number of restatements. RES_RATIO is the ratio of restatements to the total number of firms. b Panel B reports mean and median statistics of variables used in the analyses for restaters and non-restaters separately.
The median is reported in parentheses. The Difference column shows the differences in the mean and median ratios between revenue-restaters and non-restaters. The differences in the medians are tested using the Wilcoxon rank score. LOSS_NI ͑LOSS_CF͒ in year t is the proportion of years in which the firm reports negative net income before extraordinary items ͑negative operating cash flows͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive. MDARS is the four-digit SIC medianadjusted ratio of accounts receivable to sales. MDGRS is the four-digit SIC median-adjusted growth in sales computed as total sales in year t divided by total sales in year t−1. AGE is the firm's age. MV is market value of equity. ALT_Z is Altman's Z-score. SDR is the variance of abnormal returns. n is the number of observations. earnings it is no longer significant at conventional levels. Otherwise, the results for LOST_HIST are the same as for LOSS. The insignificance of the MDARS_RES coefficient in the cash flow model is somewhat surprising in view of the results from the net income valuation model ͑Equation ͑1͒͒ and previous evidence from the credit policy literature. To examine whether this result is attributable to the two-stage methodology ͑and as a general sensitivity analysis͒, we estimate a single-stage probit model that includes all of the independent variables from both stages of the two-stage probit model. The results are presented in Table 6 . While some results are similar to the two-stage model, others are not, suggesting that the more complex two-stage model is relevant to the analysis. First, LOSS is now highly significant both for the cash flow and the earnings definition. The "historical" loss ratio measure continues to be insignificant in the net-income model and highly significant in the cash-flow model. In contrast to the two-stage model, MDARS_RES is now highly significant in both the net-income and cash-flow models. SDR, SIZE, and EXP continue to be highly significant, but both LEV and TURNOVER are no longer significant. INV is no longer significant for the cash flow definition of LOSS. Consistent with intuition, LAGE is now negative and significant for all model combinations.
Overall, the results of the two probit analyses are fairly consistent with our hypotheses, especially H2. Consistent with H2, the probability of revenue manipulation is positively associated with the loss ratio in the two-stage probit model, especially when LOSS and LOSS_HIST are measured by negative cash flows. Firms that report a longer string of negative cash flows and TABLE 5 (continued) ***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The table shows the estimation results of the two-stage probit model. The dependent variable ͑REV_RES͒ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm restated revenues in year t, and 0 otherwise ͑note: P͑REV_RES t ͒ refers to the year in which financial statements are restated, not the year in which the restatements are announced͒. Variable Definitions:
LOSS ϭ in year t is the proportion of years in which the firm reports negative net income before extraordinary items ͑negative cash flows from operations͒ from year t−5 to year t+3 inclusive; LOSS_HIST ϭ in year t is the proportion of years in which the firm reports negative net income before extraordinary items ͑negative cash flows from operations͒ from year t−5 to year t inclusive; MDARS_RES ϭ residual from the credit policy regression of
, the LOSS variable is not included as a regressor͒; LEV ϭ debt-to-market value ratio; GRS ϭ growth in sales computed as total sales in year t divided by total sales in year t−1; TURNOVER ϭ absolute value of the average CAR three days around the restatement announcement for the firm's size decile; LAGE ϭ log of the firm's age; ALT_Z ϭ Altman's Z-score; SDR ϭ variance of abnormal returns; INV ϭ ratio of inventory-to-total assets; SIZE ϭ log of the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year-end; AUD ϭ dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the auditor is from the Big 8, and 0 otherwise; EXP ϭ log of the number of firms that are in the same four-digit SIC and that employ the same auditor as the firm observation; WALD ϭ Wald statistic distributed Chi-squared with 14 degrees of freedom; and LM ϭ Lagrange Multiplier statistic distributed Chi-squared with 11 degrees of freedom for testing whether
All independent variables are aligned with the year of restatement. i ͑t͒ is the firm ͑time͒ index. The definition of the variables in the regression can be found in Table 3 . losses are more likely to manipulate revenues. In addition, for the earnings loss definition in the two-stage probit, we find that the probability of revenue manipulation is positively related to the ratio of accounts receivable to total sales ͑adjusted for credit policy͒ consistent with H3 ͑i.e., firms with a high accounts receivable to sales ratio are more likely to manipulate revenues than firms with a low accounts receivable to sales ratio͒. The one-stage probit analysis is consistent with both hypotheses for both the earnings and cash flow loss definitions. In order to examine whether the results are driven by the age of the firm, we repeat the analysis and restrict our sample of "loss" firms to include only firms that are younger than the median age of our sample ͑i.e., 9 years old or less͒. The results ͑untabulated͒ are qualitatively similar to those reported.
To eliminate the possibility that our results are driven by firms in financial distress, we repeated the two-stage probit analysis after excluding all firm-years with an Altman's Z ratio less than 1.8 ͑untabulated͒. The results are virtually identical to those reported above.
Last, one could argue that an auditor with more expertise is more likely to constrain managerial manipulation. To test for this possibility we include EXP in both stages of the Table 5 model and find that it is significant and negative in both stages. The results for the other coefficients ͑untabulated͒ are qualitatively similar to those reported.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to show that the greater a firm's string of past and expected future losses, or past and expected future negative operating cash flows, the more likely it is to violate GAAP by overstating revenues and accounts receivable in order to maintain or induce a higher market valuation. This in turn suggests a new indicator of manipulation that may be used by auditors and regulators in identifying firms that are more likely to overstate revenues. Traditional valuation models, such as the Discounted Cash Flow model, cannot be applied to firms that report a consistent string of losses or negative cash flows. Hence, analysts and investors are likely to resort to revenue-based valuation models just as they do when valuing Internet firms. Indeed, we show that revenues are value relevant in explaining market value of equity, whereas earnings and cash flows are not significant in explaining the market value of equity for firms reporting negative earnings or negative cash flows. This result is consistent with the findings of Bowen et al. ͑2002͒, who report similar findings for Internet firms.
Given our assumption that revenue manipulation flows through accounts receivable, we show that firms with a more extensive string of past and anticipated losses and negative cash flows report higher accounts receivable-to-sales ratios, after controlling for the firm's credit policy as modeled by Petersen and Rajan ͑1997͒. Furthermore, the result that loss firms report a higher ratio of accounts receivable to sales is robust to various specifications of the credit policy model.
Using restatement data, we show that firms that manipulate revenues have higher loss ratios than firms that manipulate nonrevenue accounts. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that TABLE 6 (continued) ***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels, respectively.
The table shows the estimation results of the single stage probit model. The dependent variable ͑REV_RES t ͒ is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm restated revenues in year t, and 0 otherwise ͑note: P͑REV_RES t ͒ refers to the year in which financial statements are restated, not the year in which the restatements are announced͒. The independent variables are defined in Table 5 and are also aligned with the year of restatement. WALD is the Wald statistic distributed Chi-squared with 14 degrees of freedom. i ͑t͒ is the firm ͑time͒ index.
revenues are more important than expenses to loss firms since the market value of a loss firm is more likely to be based on revenues than on earnings or cash flows. We also find that the positive relation between the ex ante probability of manipulation and the loss ratio is far more significant when the loss ratio is defined in terms of negative cash flows than when defined in terms of earnings losses. This is to be expected since cash flow-based valuation such as the Discounted Cash Flow model is far more common, especially for large ͑Compustat͒ firms than earnings-based valuation. It is precisely when cash flow valuation fails that managers have an incentive to manipulate revenues in order to increase market capitalization. Finally, using a two-stage probit model, we show that the likelihood of revenue manipulation is increasing with the loss ratio, leverage, ratio of inventory to total assets, volatility of equity returns, and with the ratio of accounts receivable to sales, after controlling for the probability that the manipulation is not detected until a later stage.
Our findings have potential auditing and policy implications. Empirical evidence on equity market reactions to restatement announcements strongly suggests that the market is frequently surprised by revenue restatements. The frequency and size of these restatements implies that auditors are often unable to detect large revenue misstatements. Our findings suggest that candidates for revenue-related restatements are likely to be companies with a significant number of years of negative cash flows ͑earnings͒ and high accounts receivable to sales ratios, in addition to the other "red flag" variables that have been documented in the literature. This suggests a relatively cost-efficient indicator for both auditors and regulators to use to identify possible candidates for investigation of revenue reporting practices.
